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INTRODUCTION
In Illinois during the summer of 1998, two boys-ages seven
and eight-were charged with murdering an eleven-year-old girl
by striking her with a rock, sexually molesting her, and
suffocating her with her own underwear.1 The alleged facts of
the case were horrific and the prosecution unprecedented, with
"[jiuvenile justice experts sa[ying] they knew of no case in which
younger children had been prosecuted for murder in the United
States."2 During the investigation, the police questioned both
boys and the boys confessed without the presence of either their
parents or an attorney.3 Their parents were notified only after
the boys had already confessed to the murder.4 Yet, after police
conducted interrogations and elicited confessions from both boys,
the charges were dropped because medical experts determined
that the boys could not have produced the semen found in the
victim's underpants.5 As a result of this terrible mistake, the
City of Chicago agreed to pay 6.2 million dollars to settle a
wrongful arrest lawsuit brought by one of the boys.6
Similarly, in New York, five juveniles were arrested for
beating a woman who was jogging in Central Park. This case
also led to wide press coverage and was dubbed by the media as
the "Central Park Jogger case."7  Antron McCray, Kevin
Richardson, Yusef Salaam, Raymond Santana, and Korey Wise'
were between the ages of fourteen and sixteen when they were
arrested in connection with this crime. They were charged with
rape, attempted murder, robbery, assault, and riot. Santana,
I Pam Belluck, Chicago Boys, 7 and 8, Charged in the Brutal Killing of a Girl,





6 Gretchen Ruethling, National Briefing/Midwest: Illinois: Wrongful Arrest
Case Settled, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html
?res=9C03EFDA1630F933A1575ACOA9639C8B63&ref=ryanharris.
6 Id.
7 Ronald Sullivan, Judge Rejects Defense Claim in Central Park Jogger Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/10/nyregion/judge-
rejects-defense-claim-in-central-park-jogger-case.html.
6 While Mr. Wise's name was originally "Kharey," he had his named changed to
"Korey" in 2002 to avoid the negative publicity associated with the Central Park
Jogger case. Mea Ashley, Central Park Five's Korey Wise Opens Up About Wrongful
Conviction, NEW AM. MEDIA (May 5, 2013), http://newamericamedia.org/
2013/05/central-park-fives-korey-wise-opens-up-about-wrongful-conviction.php.
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who was only fifteen years old at the time, was interrogated for
hours without the presence of his parents.9  Despite his
attorney's challenges to the admission of the statements into
evidence, the judge told the jury that the law did not require
parents to be present for the questioning of the juveniles. 10 Years
later, after the men served time in prison, Matias Reyes-a
convicted serial rapist and murderer-confessed to the crime,
and new DNA evidence was uncovered supporting his
confession.1' The five men convicted as juveniles each served
nearly six years in prison before their release on parole; Wise had
served nearly twelve years and was only freed after the DNA
results came back. 12
Another example of a false juvenile confession took place in
Illinois in 1999.'1 Four juveniles-Michael Saunders, Harold
Richardson, Terrill Swift, and Vincent Thames-confessed to the
rape and murder of a thirty-year-old woman who was found in a
dumpster, beaten and strangled to death.14 Michael Saunders,
who was only fifteen years old at the time of the arrest, appealed
his conviction, stating that his waiver of rights was not
voluntary.'5 Michael said that when he was arrested, "three
police officers came into the room and slapped him on the neck.
One officer snatched the earring out of his ear and threw it on
the ground." 6 In addition to this deplorable treatment, the police
officers refused Michael's request to call his mother or to have an
attorney present." Despite Michael's appeal, the Appellate
Court of Illinois affirmed the lower court's decision, and Michael
9 Sullivan, supra note 7.
10 Id.
11 Barbara Ross, Inside Story from Robert Morgenthau: Spills on Central Park
Jogger Case and 35 Years of Law, DAILY NEWS (Mar. 07, 2009), http://www.ny
dailynews.com/new-york/story-robert-morgenthau-spills-central-park-jogger-case-35-
years-law-article-1.368961.
12 See id.; see also Associated Press, NYC Is Pressed To Settle Central Park
Jogger Case, USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2013/04/06/nyc-central-park-jogger/2058829/.
" Lauren Fitzpatrick, Four Englewood Men Won't be Retried for 1994 Rape and




10 People v. Saunders, 718 N.E. 2d 531, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
16 Id. at 533.
17 See id.
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was sentenced to thirty years in prison. 1 After serving
approximately fifteen years of their prison sentences, the
defendants' convictions were overturned when DNA was matched
to Johnny Douglas-also known as "Maniac"-a murderer with a
lengthy criminal history.1 9
The gravity of these cases can hardly be expressed in words.
What happened was not a mere technicality or an innocent
mistake made by authorities, but rather a tragedy that these
children have to live with for the rest of their lives. While some
of the innocent juveniles may have received monetary
compensation for their wrongful convictions, such as the 6.2
million dollar settlement described above, the horrifying
experiences these boys had undergone at such a young age is
hardly anything that can be compensated with money. In the
other two cases cited above, the accused juvenile defendants were
only exonerated after they had already spent a substantial
amount of time in prison, serving time for crimes they did not
commit. 20
Amid the publicity stemming from these trials, jurists,
attorneys, and commentators have begun to reexamine the
juvenile criminal law system and the constitutional rights
afforded to juveniles in that system. In 1974, Congress amended
the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
("Juvenile Delinquency Act" or "Act"), requiring arresting officers
to notify the parents of accused juveniles of the arrest, and to
advise the parents of their children's constitutional rights and
the nature of the offense for which their children are accused. 21
Even though the Juvenile Delinquency Act was amended to
ensure more protection for juveniles, it was unclear whether the
failure to notify a parent or guardian gave rise to a suppression
remedy.22
18 Id. at 536; Fitzpatrick, supra note 13.
19 Fitzpatrick, supra note 13; Press Release, The Innocence Project, State's
Attorney's Office Dismisses Indictment Following Ruling by Cook County Judge
Overturning Their Convictions (Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Innocence Project],
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ContentFourChicago-Men_
Exonerated of 1994_Murder andRape-byNewDNAEvidenceLinking..theCrim
e to aConvictedMurderer.php.
20 See Innocence Project, supra note 19; Ross, supra note 11.
21 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1974) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (2012)).
22 See United States v. Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
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As a consequence, various federal courts apply different
standards to determine whether a juvenile's waiver of rights is
voluntary, and therefore admissible at trial, even despite the
failure of parental notification. The majority of federal courts
hold that admissibility of the juvenile's statements is still a
function of whether the statements were knowingly and
voluntarily made, which is determined by applying the totality of
the circumstances approach.23 If the statements are found to be
voluntary, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied.24 The
Ninth Circuit applies a different standard, holding that when
§ 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act is violated, the court
must first evaluate "whether the government's conduct was so
egregious as to deprive [the juvenile] of his right to due process of
law."25 If there was no due process violation, the court must
determine whether the violation of the defendant's rights was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.26 If the violation prejudiced
the juvenile, the court has the "discretion to reverse the
conviction or order other more limited remedies so as to ensure
that the prophylactic safeguard for juveniles not be eroded or
neglected."27
Even though the Juvenile Delinquency Act was enacted to
provide juveniles with more protection and ensure uniformity,
the different approaches employed by federal courts fail to
produce consistent and just outcomes. Unless a new standard is
developed, the courts will remain divided on this issue and will
risk falsely convicting juveniles by improperly obtaining their
confessions.
This Note introduces a new standard for determining
whether juvenile confessions obtained without parental
notification, as required by the Juvenile Delinquency Act, should
be admissible into evidence. This Note examines all of the
possible standards used to evaluate voluntariness of a juvenile's
confession and proposes an amendment to the Juvenile
Delinquency Act to achieve a greater balance of protecting
juveniles' rights while ensuring that the police maintain proper
23 See United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 679 (6th Cir. 2000).
24 See id. at 680.
25 United States v. Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d 885, 902 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" See id.
27 Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tools for conducting an investigation. Under this newly proposed
standard, a per se exclusionary approach is used to keep out
testimony of juveniles under the age of fifteen who are
interrogated without the presence of both a parent and an
attorney. Further, a totality of the circumstances approach is
applied to juveniles ages fifteen and older to determine whether a
confession was made voluntarily.
Part I provides background information about the evolution
of judicial treatment of juveniles and the admissibility of
confessions. Part II analyzes the different approaches applied by
federal and state courts to determine whether a juvenile's waiver
of rights was voluntary and examines the flaws in those
approaches. Part III proposes a new approach to remedy the
problems courts have faced with the existing approaches and to
provide consistent outcomes at the federal level.
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT CONCERNING JUVENILES
A. Original Juvenile Court
The first juvenile court was created in 1899, and it embraced
the doctrine of parens patrie, meaning that the state acted in loco
parentis.28  Under this doctrine, personal handling of cases
emphasized the individual needs of the juveniles instead of
simply concentrating on their criminal behavior.29 The treatment
of juveniles was supposed to concentrate on rehabilitation
instead of incarceration °.3  The basis for this doctrine is a belief
that "children do not possess the necessary understanding or
cognition to control their actions, and therefore the court must
act as a parent to decide what is in the best interest of the
child."31 The juvenile courts placed an emphasis on the welfare of
the child and rejected the punishment model and strict procedure
applied to adults.32  This doctrine fell short, however, in that
28 Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial
Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (2004). In loco
parentis literally means "in the place of a parent." Id. at 1281 n.15.
29 Maria E. Touchet, Note, Children's Law: Investigatory Detention of Juveniles
in New Mexico: Providing Greater Protection than Miranda Rights for Children in
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addressing the child's best interests does not guarantee that a
juvenile is afforded constitutionally mandated due process
33protections.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 34  Because the courts did not give children any rights,
children had no due process protection.3 5  Further, juvenile
proceedings were considered civil, not criminal, which resulted in
juveniles being denied due process otherwise afforded to adult
defendants. 6 Noting this disparity, the United States Supreme
Court, in In re Gault,37 commented that "[t]he absence of
procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not
always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures." 8
Accordingly, the subsequent cases began to reflect a change in
the way courts handled juvenile suspects.
B. Haley v. Ohio
Decided in 1947, Haley v. Ohio39 was the first case in which
the Supreme Court recognized that juveniles should be afforded
extra protection during custodial interrogations as a matter of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 ° In Haley, Ohio
police officers arrested a fifteen-year-old boy, and two others, for
their alleged involvement in a robbery and murder.41  The
juvenile was questioned for approximately five hours between the
hours of 12:00 A.M. and 5:00 A.M.42 He was not allowed to see
his mother or a lawyer during the questioning. 43 Further, the
33 Id. (stating that the juveniles were not deprived of any rights because they
did not possess any rights to begin with).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35 Id.
36 See Farber, supra note 28.
3' 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
38 Id. at 18.
39 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
40 Id. at 599.
41 Id. at 597.
42 Id. at 597-98. There was evidence that the juvenile was beaten. Id. His
mother testified that the clothes he wore during questioning were blood-stained and
torn. Id.
43 Id. at 598.
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boy was not advised of his right to counsel.44 Eventually, after
being shown the alleged confessions of the co-defendants, the
juvenile confessed to the crime.45 "A confession was typed in
question and answer form by the police."46
Following his confession, the boy was isolated for three days,
where even a lawyer who his mother had retained was not
allowed to see him.47 As a result of his confession, the jury
convicted the juvenile on the murder and robbery charges.48 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed his conviction on the grounds
that the interrogation methods the officers employed were
inappropriate for juveniles.4" The Court specifically noted the
child's age, stating that "when, as here, a mere child-an easy
victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the
record must be used." ° The Court further emphasized, "That
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens."51  Further, the Court
commented that the boy needed someone to be present during the
questioning, emphasizing that "[h]e needs someone on whom to
lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it,
may not crush him." 2
C. Gallegos v. Colorado
Another landmark case, Gallegos v. Colorado,3 introduced
the totality of the circumstances test to determine the
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession.54 In Gallegos, a fourteen-




47 Id. (explaining that the lawyer tried to see the boy twice, but was denied
admission by the police).
48 See id. at 597.
49 See id. at 600-01. "We do not think the methods used in obtaining this
confession can be sequared [sic] with that due process of law which the Fourteenth
Amendment commands." Id. at 599.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 600 (noting specifically that the boy's mother was not allowed to see
him for over five days after his arrest).
53 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
54 See id. at 55.
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man, a crime which he immediately admitted to committing.55
As a result of the attack, the victim of the assault died, and the
boy was then charged with first degree murder.56 The boy was
convicted upon his formal confession, which he signed after being
held for five days without seeing a lawyer, a parent, or any other
familiar adult.5
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction.5" The Court affirmed its decision in Haley and
reiterated the need for extra protection of juveniles during
interrogations.59 The Court further noted that a "14-year old boy,
no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception
of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the
police."60 The Court took into account the age of the boy and his
limited capacity to understand by pointing out that the Court
was "deal[ing] with a person who is not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to"
protect his constitutional rights.6
The Court emphasized the importance of the presence of an
interested adult during questioning, stating that a "lawyer or an
adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the
protection which his own immaturity could not."62 Further, the
Court created the totality of the circumstances test, explaining
that the youth of the petitioner, length of questioning, use of fear
to break a suspect, and accessibility to a lawyer are all factors
that need to be evaluated in determining whether the confession
is admissible.63
11 See id. at 49-50 (stating that the defendant in this case, along with another
juvenile, followed an elderly man to a hotel, gained entry into his room, assaulted
him, stole his money, and fled).
56 See id. at 50.
" See id. (describing that the jury found the defendant guilty based mainly on a
signed formal confession). The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the conviction.
Id.
58 Id. at 55.
11 See id. at 53 (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948)).
60 Id. at 54.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 55 (pointing out that "[t]here is no guide to the decision of cases
such as this, except the totality of circumstances" surrounding the facts of each
case).
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND DIFFERENT STANDARDS
USED FOR EVALUATING VOLUNTARINESS OF A JUVENILE'S
STATEMENTS
A. Miranda v. Arizona
Four years after the Gallegos decision, in the landmark case
entitled Miranda v. Arizona,64 the United States Supreme Court
held that all suspects in custody must be advised of their
constitutional rights before an interrogation can begin.65 The
Court prescribed words of warning that have become familiar to
all police officers, lawyers, and most of the public-words that
are known today as the Miranda warning.
In formulating the Miranda warning, the Court held that
police officers must advise a suspect of his "right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney."66 Additionally, the Court stated that questioning must
stop if the defendant wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking. And, although the suspect may waive these rights,
such waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently."68  Even though the Court stressed that "the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights," the decision rested on the assumption that by simply
informing the accused of his rights, the accused will be able to
comprehend them and, accordingly, assert or waive them
voluntarily. 9 While the Supreme Court established adequate
protection for adult suspects held in custody, it failed to address
the effectiveness of the Miranda warning when a suspect is
unable to comprehend the warning "due to a lack of maturity or
sufficient cognitive development."70
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
65 Id. at 444.
6 Id. ("[Tihe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination.").
61 See id. at 444-45.
68 Id. at 444.
69 Id. at 467, 473 (stating that sometimes a police officer might have to more
fully explain the meaning of the warning).
70 Robert E. McGuire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights:
Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1366 (2000).
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B. Miranda Application to Juveniles
The first time the Supreme Court addressed the applicability
of Miranda to juveniles was in In re Gault.71 In Gault, the
suspect was a fifteen-year-old boy who was arrested on the
charge of making lewd telephone calls.7 ' The boy's parents were
not notified that he was taken into custody, and neither the boy
nor his parents were advised that the juvenile had a right to
refuse to speak with the police or that any incriminating
statements may be used against him in a proceeding.73 The trial
court admitted the boy's statements into evidence and he was
adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a juvenile
institution.74
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court
and held that juveniles should be provided with the same
constitutional safeguards of due process as adults, and thus, the
Miranda warning should have been administered prior to
questioning the juvenile. 75 The Court opined:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must
be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that
counsel will be appointed to represent the child.76
The Court also took into consideration that juvenile
confessions have to be handled with special caution because of
the young age of accused juveniles.77 Even though the Supreme
Court addressed the juvenile's right to receive the Miranda
71 See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72 Id. at 4 (stating that the phone calls included remarks of "offensive,
adolescent, sex variety").
13 Id. at 5, 9-10.
"' Id. at 7-10. Since no appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases, the
defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of
Arizona. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court of Arizona dismissed the writ. Id. at 10.
75 Id. at 28-30.
76 Id. at 41.
7 See id. at 45-46 (stating that there is a difference between procedural rights
accorded to adults as opposed to juveniles).
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warning, the Court did not address how to determine the
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession when it is elicited without
parental notification.7"
C. Juvenile Delinquency Act
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974 was passed in response to Miranda and In re Gault.79 "The
Act amended the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act which had
been virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1938.80
According to a Senate Report, the purpose of the amendment was
"to provide basic procedural rights for juveniles who come under
Federal jurisdiction and to bring Federal procedures up to the
standards set by various model acts, many state codes and court
decisions."81 Congress recognized that there was a pressing need
for national standards to improve the quality of juvenile contacts
with the justice system. 2 Among other things, the Juvenile
Delinquency Act was intended to provide basic procedural
safeguards available to juveniles immediately after their arrest.8 3
One such procedural safeguard was parental notification. As
amended, § 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act provides:
Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of
juvenile delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately
advise such juvenile of his legal rights, in language
comprehensive to a juvenile, and shall immediately notify the
Attorney General and the juvenile's parents, guardian, or
custodian of such custody. The arresting officer shall also notify
the parents, guardian, or custodian of the rights of the juvenile
and of the nature of the alleged offense. s4
While the Act was meant to provide juveniles more
protection by ensuring that their parents, guardians, or
custodians ("parents") are notified of the juvenile's rights, the Act
78 See Thomas J. Von Wald, Student Article, No Questions Asked! State v.
Horse: A Proposition for a Per Se Rule When Interrogating Juveniles, 48 S.D. L. REV.
143, 144 (2003).
71 See Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415,
§ 5033, 88 Stat. 1109, 1134 (1974).
80 William S. Sessions & Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 509, 509 (1983) (footnote omitted).
81 S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284.
82 See id.
83 See United States v. Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d 885, 899 (9th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
84 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (2012).
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failed to address whether the parents have to actually be given
an opportunity to consult with their children or be given an
opportunity to be present during the interrogation. Regrettably,
the legislative history does not expound upon the underlying
purpose of the notification provision.15 And even though the Act
clearly intended that parents be notified of juveniles' rights, it
remains unclear whether failure of parental notification would
require a suppression remedy. Lack of legislative history and the
ambiguity within the statutory text left federal courts to
formulate their own standards of admissibility of juveniles'
statements obtained without parental notification.
Consequently, federal courts have developed two different
standards.
1. Standards Developed by Federal Courts
The issue of admissibility of juveniles' statements made
without parental notification has not been a highly litigated
matter. Those circuit courts that have addressed it, however,
have developed two different standards: the totality of the
circumstances approach and the Ninth Circuit approach." The
per se exclusionary approach, which automatically suppresses
juveniles' statements obtained without parental notification, has
been rejected by the federal courts."
The Second, 8 Sixth, 9 Tenth, 90 and Eleventh9 Circuits have
held that the admissibility of juveniles' statements is a function
8" See generally S. REP. No. 93-1011, supra note 81 (outlining the problems of
juvenile delinquency and ways to solve it).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 679 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying the
totality of the circumstances approach); Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d at 901-04
(developing a separate standard for determining admissibility of juveniles'
statements made without parental notification).
87 See, e.g., In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 939 (Vt. 1982) (citing Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 857 (1979)) (applying the per se
exclusionary approach).
88 See United States v. Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d 312, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
89 See Doe, 226 F.3d at 679 (citing McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 458 (6th Cir.
1988)). In Doe, the juvenile defendant was charged with conspiring to distribute
crack cocaine, carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, and
knowingly possessing a handgun. Id. at 676.
98 See United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 8 (10th Cir. 1975). In Watts, the
juvenile defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged offense, and
was charged with the manslaughter of his brother. See id. at 6.
1 See United States v. Kerr, 120 F.3d 239, 241-42 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(explaining that there is no requirement that a parent be present in order for a
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of whether the statements were knowingly and voluntarily made
in compliance with due process.92  To determine the
voluntariness of such statements, courts have held that the
failure to notify a parent or guardian after the juvenile's arrest,
as required by § 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, is one of
the factors the court should consider when evaluating the totality
of the circumstances surrounding a juvenile's statements to law
enforcement. 93
These circuit courts generally found that in deciding whether
a confession was voluntarily made, some of the following factors
may be considered:
(1) the time between the defendant's arrest and arraignment;
(2) whether the defendant knew the nature of the charged or
suspected offense; (3) whether the defendant was advised that
he was not required to make any statements and that his
statements could be used against him; (4) whether the
defendant was advised of his right to the assistance of counsel
before being questioned; and (5) whether the defendant was
without the assistance of counsel when questioned." 94
The courts also considered whether the defendant's parents were
notified.9 If, under the totality of the circumstances test, the
court finds that the statements were knowingly and voluntarily
made, the motion to suppress the statements will be denied.96 If,
however, after considering all of the circumstances, the court
determines that the statements were not voluntary, the court
will grant the motion to suppress.97
juvenile's statement to be admissible, and that when evaluating the totality of the
circumstances, the juvenile's statements were freely and voluntarily given).
92 See Doe, 226 F.3d at 679 (citing McCall, 863 F.2d at 458).
93 See Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 321. In Guzman, a seventeen-year-old
juvenile was charged with participating in aid of the racketeering activities of the
MS-13 street gang and in the murder of a woman and her son. See id. at 315.
94 Doe, 226 F.3d at 679 (citing United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 751 (6th
Cir. 1997)). "In effect, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances to
evaluate whether a confession was voluntarily made." Id. (quoting Weekley, 130 F.3d
at 751).
9' See id.
96 See id. at 680 (stating that after evaluating the totality of the circumstances,
the record provided strong support for the admission of Doe's confession),
" See United States v. Nash, 620 F. Supp. 1439, 1444 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating
that under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the court found that these
statements should be suppressed).
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The Ninth Circuit employs a different standard for
determining whether juvenile statements made without parental
notification should be admissible.98 First, the court addresses
whether the government violated the requirements of the
Juvenile Delinquency Act.99 If it did, the court reaches the
second question of whether the government's conduct was so
egregious as to deprive the juvenile defendant of the right to due
process of law. 100 In evaluating whether due process has been
denied, the court reviews the juvenile's waiver of rights under
the totality of the circumstances, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the defendant, as well as whether
there was parental notification. 10 ' If the juvenile was not
deprived of due process of law, the third question is whether the
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 2  If the
statutory violations prejudiced the juvenile defendant, the court
has discretion to reverse or to order more limited remedies so as
to ensure that the juvenile's "rights are safeguarded and the will
of Congress is not thwarted."' In determining the harmlessness
of a juvenile confession, the inquiry is whether the statutory
violation was a cause of the juvenile's confession and whether the
confession caused prejudice to the juvenile.0 4
98 See United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing how
a juvenile was arrested for smuggling drugs); see also United States v. Juvenile
Male, 595 F.3d 885, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that a juvenile was arrested by
federal border patrol agents on suspicion of smuggling aliens into the United States).
'9 See Doe, 219 F.3d at 1015 (stating that the Juvenile Delinquency Act requires
the government to advise a juvenile's parents of his Miranda rights and that in this
case the government failed to notify the juvenile's parents); see also Juvenile Male,
595 F.3d at 903 (finding that provisions of § 5033 had been violated).
100 See Doe, 219 F.3d at 1016 (explaining that "[d]ue process is denied when the
violation of § 5033 adversely effects [sic] the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings"); see also Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d at 902.
101 See Doe, 219 F.3d at 1016 (stating that under the totality of the
circumstances, the notification in this case did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation).
'02 See id. at 1017 ("Suppression of the statements may be appropriate if the
violation was not harmless to the juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also
Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d at 902 (stating that if there is no due process violation, the
court must consider whether the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
103 Doe, 219 F.3d at 1017; see also Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d at 902-03.
104 See Doe, 219 F.3d at 1017 ("Only if the violation was a cause of the confession




The two different standards formulated by the federal courts
have created inconsistent outcomes. In addition to inconsistency
of application, both of these standards are flawed and fail to
properly account for juveniles' ages and their limited cognitive
understanding of the Miranda warning.
a. Totality of the Circumstances Approach
A totality of the circumstances approach was first employed
by the Court in Fare v. Michael C. 105 to determine whether a
juvenile suspect's waiver of rights was voluntary.16 The
defendant was a sixteen-year-old boy who was questioned as a
murder suspect. 107 Even though Michael was given his Miranda
rights, he was denied a request to see his probation officer °10
Subsequently, Michael confessed to the crime and drew
incriminating sketches. 10 9 The defense moved to suppress the
confessions and the incriminating sketches on the ground that
they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, arguing
that a request to see a probation officer is similar to an
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent once a
request to see an attorney is made.1 ' The motion was denied by
the trial court and Michael's confession was used to convict
him.11
The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's position
that Michael's request to see his probation officer was a per se
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. 112 Instead, the Court
employed the totality of the circumstances approach to determine
whether Michael's confession was voluntary." 3 It described the
totality of the circumstances approach as an evaluation of "the
juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and
105 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
106 See id. at 725.
107 See id. at 710.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 711.
110 See id. at 711-12.
111 See id. at 712, 714-15 (stating that the trial court denied the motion because
the juvenile waived his Miranda rights, despite his request to see his probation
officer, because a request to see a probation officer was a per se invocation of Fifth
Amendment rights, similar to a request for an attorney).
112 See id. at 719, 727.
I13 See id. at 725 (stating that a totality of the circumstances approach is
adequate even when interrogation of juveniles is involved).
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intelligence, and ... whether he has the capacity to understand
the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights."114
Ultimately, after considering all of the pertinent factors, the
Supreme Court concluded that Michael's confession was
voluntary.11 Yet, unlike the decisions in Haley and Gallegos,
which treated juvenile confessions with "special care," the Court's
decision in Fare established a new precedent for evaluating the
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession by using the same
standard that applies to adult confessions.116 Based on this
decision, the majority of states began applying the totality of the
circumstances approach to determine whether a juvenile's waiver
of rights was voluntary.117 After the passage of the Juvenile
Delinquency Act, requiring parental notification upon a juvenile's
arrest, federal courts also began to apply the totality of the
circumstances approach to determine the voluntariness of a
juvenile's statements."" Under the totality of the circumstances
approach, lack of parental notice was only one of the factors
considered.119
Even though the totality of the circumstances approach
became popular among federal and state courts, there are flaws
that emerge from its application. And because this approach is
similarly applied on the state, as well as the federal, level, it is
instructive to analyze both types of judicial precedents to
demonstrate the flaws associated with each level.
There are several problems that emerge from the application
of the totality of the circumstances approach. First, courts have
no guidance as to how heavily they should weigh each factor.120
Second, police officers are uncertain about the proper procedure
for interrogating juveniles.'2 ' Third, applying the totality of the
circumstances approach permits the government to disregard
114 Id. ("The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.").
115 See id. at 726.
116 See Nashiba F. Boyd, Comment, "I Didn't Do It, I Was Forced To Say That I
Did": The Problem of Coerced Juvenile Confessions, and Proposed Federal
Legislation to Prevent Them, 47 HOW. L.J. 395, 409-10 (2004).
11 See id. at 412.
, See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 679 (6th Cir. 2000).
9 See id. at 679.
"0 See Boyd, supra note 116, at 411.
1 Id. at 414-15.
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
procedural safeguards that Congress meant to provide to
juveniles by enacting the Juvenile Delinquency Act. And finally,
different jurisdictions vary in their treatment of parental
absence, leading to inconsistent results.
When the Supreme Court articulated the totality of the
circumstances test in Fare v. Michael C., the test was left
intentionally vague so that lower court judges would have
enough flexibility to make proper decisions concerning the
juveniles' waiver of rights. 2 The flexible standard described in
Fare, however, has not been followed by all courts. 123 Precisely
because the Supreme Court left the test intentionally vague,
courts have no guidance as to how heavily each factor should be
weighed, 124 resulting not only in inconsistent outcomes, but often
in absurd outcomes. 25 Many courts have upheld waivers as
voluntary despite the juvenile's youth, immaturity, or even low
I.Q. level. 126
For instance, in State v. Jones,1 27 the juvenile suspect offered
testimony that his I.Q. was in the range of mental retardation,
and that he was depressed and extremely susceptible to
domination by persons whom he perceived to be in positions of
authority, yet the court still found that his waiver was
voluntary.28 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Darden,29 the court
found the waiver of a fifteen-year-old, who was questioned
without the presence of his parents or an attorney, to be
voluntary despite the fact that the boy had "a verbal I.Q. of 71, a
performance I.Q. of 75 and a full scale I.Q. of 76, 'classifying him
122 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his
probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to
remain silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary
flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver determination.
Id.
123 See W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Farmer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how the Florida court engaged in a rigid application of the
totality of the circumstances test).
124 See Boyd, supra note 116, at 411 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court did
not address, for instance, whether age is a more important factor than prior
experience in the court system).
125 See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
126 See State v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 325 (Minn. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Darden, 271 A.2d 257, 260 (Pa. 1970).
127 566 N.W.2d 317.
128 Id. at 325, 327.
129 271 A.2d 257.
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at a border line of a mildly retarded level.' " Miranda waivers
by juveniles as young as eleven years old, given without the
presence of a parent, have been found to be voluntary by state
courts in South Carolina,13 1 Ohio,132 and Oregon.
133
In W.M. v. Florida,134 a court found that a ten-year-old
voluntarily waived his rights, yet the dissenting judge wrote that
"not a single objective factor suggests voluntariness." 13  The
dissenting judge stated that the test applied by the court seemed
to be the "very antithesis" of the totality of the circumstances
test, when the court found a confession to be voluntary despite
being elicited from a ten-year-old who had an "I.Q. of 69 or 70,
who had been placed by school authorities in a learning disability
program and was described.., as having difficulty in
understanding directions, who had no prior record with the
police,.., and who was then held by the police for nearly 6
hours."
1 36
Another problem with the totality of the circumstances
approach is that there are no definite standards as to how to
apply the totality test. Therefore, law enforcement officers have
no guidance as to how to properly interrogate juveniles. 137 For
instance, in United States v. Guzman, 138 even though law
enforcement agents were aware of the identity of the juvenile's
mother and failed to contact her, the court denied the juvenile's
motion to suppress his statements when applying the totality of
131 Id. at 260 (noting that a clinical psychologist testified that in terms of
chronological test age, the juvenile would range "from a youngster chronologically
aged 8 to 11 (years)").
... See, e.g., In re Christopher W., 329 S.E.2d 769, 769 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(discussing that the suspect was an eleven-year-old boy whose waiver was upheld as
voluntary on appeal without an evaluation of the boy's understanding of the
warnings, his intelligence, or his prior court experience).
1-2 In re Goins, 738 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (discussing that the
suspect was an eleven-year-old boy whose confession was elicited without the
presence of a parent and upholding the waiver of the boy's rights on appeal, finding
the waiver to be voluntary).
133 State ex rel Juvenile Dep't of Wash. Cnty. v. Deford, 34 P.3d 673, 676-78 (Or.
Ct. App. 2001) (upholding an eleven-year-old suspect's waiver of rights, despite the
fact that the juvenile was questioned without the presence of a parent or a lawyer
and had the "cognitive capacity of a seven-year-old child").
134 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (per
curiam).
13' Id. at 985.
136 Id. at 983, 985.
137 Boyd, supra note 116, at 414.
138 879 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
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the circumstances approach. 139  On the other hand, in United
States v. Nash,140 in which two juveniles were arrested and their
respective family members were advised of the arrest and
charges filed against them, the court found that such efforts to
notify were not sufficient and that the statements should be
suppressed.' Therefore, it is often unclear whether the
statements elicited from the juvenile will be admitted in court,
thereby leading to inconsistent and unpredictable judgments. 142
In Haley v. Ohio, Justice Frankfurter noted that because there is
a lack of guidance, the totality of the circumstances test "invites
psychological judgment-a psychological judgment that reflects
deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society."
Additionally, admitting juveniles' statements given without
parental notification presents the danger of law enforcement
ignoring the statutory notification requirement without any
consequences. By permitting the government to ignore the
requirements of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the courts seem to
plainly disregard the procedural safeguards Congress meant to
provide juveniles to protect their due process rights, thus
thwarting the will of Congress. This sets a dangerous precedent
for disregarding an important statutory requirement that would
entail no consequences for improper actions by law enforcement.
Section 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act requires only
that the arresting officer notify the parent of the juvenile's rights
and of the nature of the alleged offense. It does not expressly
provide that the parent has a right to be present during the
interrogation or to consult with the juvenile regarding the
juvenile's rights. Such ambiguity provides for inconsistency in
the application of the totality of the circumstances approach,
permitting different jurisdictions to vary in the weight given to
the lack of parental notice and leaving room for various
interpretations of the statute.
139 Id. at 316.
140 620 F. Supp. 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
141 See id. at 1440, 1443 (stating that even though the government's efforts at
notification were made with good intentions, the government did not satisfy the
statute).
142 See Boyd, supra note 116, at 414-15.
143 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1" 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (2012).
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For instance, some courts fail to require that the parents and
children be informed that they could consult in private or that
they could discuss the consequences of waiving the child's rights,
stating that § 5033 of the Act does not mandate parental
consultation in order for a juvenile's statements to be
admissible.'45 Other courts have held that a juvenile does not
have a constitutional or statutory right to have an adult present
during the interrogation.1 46 On the other hand, some judges give
more weight to parental involvement. As Judge Holloway
pointed out, notice to the parents is not merely for protection of
their right to custody, "but is notice required for the juvenile's
benefit to insure that the parents may have a reasonable
opportunity to participate in preparing and presenting the
juvenile's case."'47  Such inconsistency of application
demonstrates the glaring flaws of the totality of the
circumstances approach.
b. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The standard formulated by the Ninth Circuit is more
stringent and is intended to afford juveniles more protection.
Under this standard, after determining whether there was a
violation of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the court applies the
totality of the circumstances approach to determine whether the
juvenile was deprived of due process of law."4s Even if due
process has not been denied, the court further makes a
determination as to whether the violation of the Juvenile
Delinquency Act was harmless to the juvenile beyond a
reasonable doubt.'49 If the statutory violation was a cause of the
juvenile's confession, and the prejudice was caused by the
confession, the court has discretion to suppress the statement "or
to order more limited remedies so as to ensure that [the
defendant's] rights are safeguarded.""'
45 See, e.g., United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1982).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 620 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
147 United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 10 (10th Cir. 1975) (Holloway, J.,
concurring).
148 See United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000).
149 Id. at 1017.
10 See id. (alteration in original).
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Aside from the flawed totality of the circumstances approach
used under this standard to determine whether there was a
violation of due process, this standard presents additional
problems. Even though the Ninth Circuit standard affords
juveniles more protection, its application is problematic when
determining whether the juvenile was prejudiced by the
statutory violation. Because there is no clear standard for
determining whether the statutory violation was, in fact, a cause
of the confession and prejudicial to the juvenile, it leaves judges
to fill in the gaps, often resulting in inconsistent opinions.
While some judges remand this question for further findings
of fact, others make their own determinations. For instance, in
United States v. Doe,' a fifteen-year-old juvenile was arrested
and convicted for smuggling aliens from Mexico into the United
States.152 Upon arrest, border patrol agents failed to notify either
his parents or the Mexican Consulate, as required by § 5033 of
the Juvenile Delinquency Act.1 53 The court remanded the case to
determine whether the statutory violations prejudiced the
juvenile."5 However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Tang stated
that the violations were so egregious that "we could easily
conclude that [the juvenile] was prejudiced without a remand for
further fact finding." 5 On the other hand, Judge Wallace opined
that the record demonstrated that the juvenile suffered no
prejudice. 156
Similarly, in United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A), 57 while the
court held that the statutory violation was prejudicial, 58 Judge
Trott dissented, stating that the failure to notify was harmless
beyond all reasonable doubt.'5 9 This demonstrates the difficulty
of determining whether there has been harmless error and
invites various judicial opinions, as opposed to consistent
application of law.
"5' 862 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1988).
152 Id. at 777-78.
153 See id. at 780 (stating that even if the government made reasonable efforts to
contact Doe's parents, it violated the statute by failing to show that it notified the
Mexican Consulate of Doe's arrest and of the charges against him).
1- Id. at 781 ("The connection between the government's misconduct and [the]
confessions is a factual question to be explored on remand.").
155 Id. at 782 (Tang, J., concurring).
156 Id. (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
157 229 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2000).
158 Id. at 747 (holding that there is no doubt that the errors were prejudicial).
159 Id. at 749 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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Additionally, this approach is flawed because it lacks
predictability and uniformity. The Ninth Circuit standard first
requires a determination of whether there was a violation of the
Juvenile Delinquency Act and, if so, whether it deprived the
defendant of the right to due process, which requires an
application of the totality of the circumstances approach. 160 In
addition to the already imperfect totality of the circumstances
approach, it requires a determination of harmlessness.16 '
Determination of harmlessness, in turn, requires an evaluation
of "whether the statutory violation was a cause of the juvenile's
confession" and whether the confession caused the prejudice. 62
Overall, this leaves judges with several different legal
determinations and a great amount of discretion in their
decisions, resulting in lack of predictability and uniformity.
Predictability and uniformity are an essential part of our justice
system and are especially important when dealing with juvenile
offenders. Lack thereof hardly serves the purpose of improving
the quality of juvenile contacts with the justice system intended
by the Juvenile Delinquency Act. 16 3
In determining which standard should be employed to
determine admissibility of juveniles' statements obtained without
parental notification, it is important to examine all possible
alternatives. One such alternative-employed by several states
but explicitly rejected by the federal courts-is the per se
exclusionary approach. 6 4
2. Per Se Exclusionary Approach
The per se exclusionary approach provides important
"procedural safeguards" to afford juveniles more protection.' 65
The requirements under this approach have a wide range, "from
mandating the presence of counsel during the interrogation of a
juvenile under thirteen years of age, to mandating the presence
160 See United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000).
161 Id. at 1017.
162 Id.
163 See supra text accompanying note 82 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1011 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284).
164 See United States v. Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d 312, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
165 Farber, supra note 28, at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of a parent or guardian who has been apprised of the juvenile's
Miranda rights and is capable of knowingly and intelligently
waiving these rights on the juvenile's behalf."'66
The per se rule is based on a "public policy determination
that juveniles do not have the capacity to understand or waive
their right against incrimination and so they need an adult's help
to make this decision."167 In In re E.T.C.,'6 the Supreme Court of
Vermont articulated the reasons for implementing the per se
rule:
It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one
whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry,
purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood,
should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult
when asked to waive important ... rights at a time most critical
to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.16
9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded
that a juvenile's statements will not be admissible unless the
state can show that "an interested adult was present, understood
the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain [the warning
and the] rights to the juvenile." 7 °  In Lewis v. State,'7' the
Indiana Supreme Court applied the per se exclusionary rule
because of the insufficiency of the totality of the circumstances
test in setting proper guidelines. 72
Delaware, Wyoming, and Florida, among other states, have
implemented statutory per se exclusionary approaches in respect
to juveniles' waiver of Miranda rights. 73 For instance, a statute
in Colorado states in pertinent part:
No statements or admissions of a juvenile made as a result of
the custodial interrogation of such juvenile by a law
166 Id.
167 Von Wald, supra note 78, at 161.
18 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982).
169 Id. at 939 (quoting Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141-42 (Ind. 1972)).
170 Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983).
171 288 N.E.2d 138.
172 Id. at 142 (reversing a conviction of a juvenile who confessed to murder when
notice was not given to either a parent or an attorney of the juvenile's rights).
173 See, e.g., Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230, 1250 (Del. 2000) (suppressing
juvenile's statements due to violation of a statute); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117,
1117 (Wyo. 1992) (advising that police must fulfill the notification statute before
juvenile statements are admissible); Sublette v. State, 365 So. 2d 775, 777 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the failure to notify parents after a child is taken into
custody causes juvenile statements to be inadmissible).
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enforcement official concerning delinquent acts alleged to have
been committed by the juvenile shall be admissible in evidence
against such juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or
physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such
interrogation and the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian,
or legal or physical custodian were advised of the juvenile's
right[s] ....174
North Carolina is another state that has implemented a per
se approach through legislation, as it has a statute which
mandates that "[w]hen the juvenile is less than 14 years of age,
no in-custody admission or confession resulting from
interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless the
confession or admission was made in the presence of the
juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney."175 Oklahoma
also renders statements inadmissible unless a parent, a
guardian, or a legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was
present during the interrogation and was advised of the
juvenile's rights.176
Even though the per se exclusionary approach affords more
protection to juveniles than the totality of the circumstances
approach, it is similarly not without flaws. One of the problems
with the per se exclusionary method is that it assumes that the
parents or persons standing in the interest of the juvenile would
actually be able to assist the child in understanding and deciding
to waive the child's rights. 77 The approach fails to account for
the fact that some parents may not be able to understand the
Miranda warning themselves. 7 8  Associate Professor of
Psychology at Saint Louis University, Thomas Grisso, notes,
"Commentators have observed that many parents do not care,
and that often the parents are, at best, only equal in capacity to
174 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 1999).
175 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101 (West 1999).
176 See, e.g., C.G.H. v. State, 580 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (citing
an Oklahoma statute that provides "[nlo information gained by questioning a child
shall be admissible into evidence against the child unless the questioning about any
alleged offense by law enforcement officer or investigative agency, or employee of the
court, or the Department is done in the presence of said child's parents, guardian,
attorney, or the legal custodian of the child, and not until the child and his parents,
or guardian, or other legal custodian shall be fully advised of their constitutional
and legal rights, including the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings") (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (West 1995).
17 Boyd, supra note 116, at 419.
178 Id.
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the child and therefore poorly equipped to comprehend the
complexities confronting them."'17 9 Therefore, applying this test
may cause more harm than good because parents may be giving
the juvenile wrong advice.' °
A second problem with the per se exclusionary approach is
that many times, parents coerce their child into confessing, even
if it is not in the child's best legal interests. 8 1 For instance, in
Anglin v. State,182 a fifteen-year-old boy's mother told him that if
he did not tell police the truth, she would "clobber him";
subsequently the boy confessed to participation in robbery and
murder. 8 3  Additionally, in In re Carter,14 two juvenile girls,
arrested for engaging in sexual acts and consuming controlled
substances, were threatened by their parents and pastor until
they made a confession.8 5 As Grisso concluded in his study, "[I]n
the almost 400 juvenile interrogations examined, 70 to 80
percent of parents offered no advice to their children, and when
parental advice was given, parents were far more likely to advise
their children to waive their rights than to assert them."18 6
Further, although the per se exclusionary approach was
intended to remedy the flaws of the totality of the circumstances
test, it lacks consistency. In Colorado, for instance, the juvenile
confession statute mandates that a juvenile must have the
opportunity to have a parent present at the interrogation and
gives the juvenile an opportunity to consult with the parent. 8 7
On the other hand, in North Dakota, in some circumstances the
juvenile confession statute requires that counsel be present with
the juvenile during the interrogation.18  In Massachusetts,
actual consultation with a parent during an interrogation is not
required; a juvenile under the age of fourteen merely needs to be
17' Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities To Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1163 (1980) (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1s Boyd, supra note 116, at 419.
181 Id.
182 Anglin v. State, 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
183 Id. at 752.
184 318 A.2d 269 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
18- Id. at 275-76 (reasoning that because it was not the police who threatened
the girls, their confessions were voluntary).
186 Boyd, supra note 116, at 420.
187 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 1999).
'm N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-26 (West 2012).
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given an opportunity to consult with a parent.8 9 Although there
is no potential for speculation as there is under the totality of the
circumstances approach, the inconsistency between jurisdictions
remains with the per se exclusionary approach as well. 190
D. Understanding the Differences Between Adults' and
Juveniles' Cognitive Development
To understand a juvenile's capacity to waive rights, it is
important to have a basic knowledge of adolescent psychological
and brain development.' 9 ' Neuroscience helps explain adolescent
development and points to the conclusion that children cannot
think and reason like adults. 192 Research shows that children
and adults use different areas of the brain to analyze a similar
situation.193 Further, a juvenile's "sense of time, lack of future
orientation, labile emotions, calculus of risk and gain, and
vulnerability to pressure will often drive him or her to make very
different decisions than an adult would in similar
circumstances." 194  These differences between adolescent and
adult psychology are exacerbated when a juvenile is "under
stress and without adult support or guidance."'95
Courts have long recognized the importance of the
relationship between parents and children.' 96  In Meyer v.
Nebraska,197 the Supreme Court held that parents possess the
fundamental right to "bring up children."'9' Further, in People v.
189 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 67 (West 2013); see also Farber, supra
note 28, at 1290.
190 Boyd, supra note 116, at 420.
191 Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail To
Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of
Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 431, 434 (2006).
192 Id. at 434-35 (stating that adults and adolescents have a different perception
of the same experience because each uses a different area of the brain to analyze a
situation, and that adults and adolescents have a different capacity to process
information).
19 Id. at 435.
194 Id. at 436.
195 Id.
196 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides the freedom to establish a home and raise children).
197 Id. at 390.
198 Id. at 399.
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Castro,'99 the court reasoned that "history and society ... looked
upon parents as the true and faithful guardians and protectors of
their child's moral and legal rights." 0
Because of the significance of the relationship between
parents and children, it is important to evaluate the need for the
presence of a parent when a juvenile is being questioned.
Thomas Grisso conducted an empirical study of juveniles and
their ability to understand the words and phrases of the Miranda
warning when questioned alone.20 ' In his study, Grisso employed
both lawyers and psychologists and administered three different
tests to three samples of juveniles and two samples of adults.2 2
Grisso's study concluded that juveniles under the age of fifteen
could not give a meaningful Miranda waiver.23  Additionally,
Grisso noted that the juveniles who participated in the study
were questioned under optimal circumstances, which would not
be provided when juveniles are interrogated by police officers.20 4
Therefore, the study demonstrates further that administration of
the Miranda warning to a juvenile under "real world" conditions
is even more unlikely to produce a "voluntary" confession.2 5
Grisso concluded that "juveniles younger than fifteen years old
require some form of assistance if they are to waive their rights
knowingly."206 Additionally, statistical evidence demonstrates
that a large percentage of adjudicated juveniles are learning-
disabled, which exacerbates the problem of obtaining knowing
and voluntary waivers of Miranda rights among juveniles.2 7
Besides not being able to appreciate and knowingly waive
their Miranda rights, most children are more susceptible to
giving false confessions.2 8 Research demonstrates that children
199 118 Misc. 2d 868, 462 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1983).
200 Id. at 377.
201 See Grisso, supra note 179, at 1135-36 (evaluating whether juveniles
understand the words and phrases used in the Miranda warning and whether they
accurately perceive the function and significance of the rights that the warning
provides).
202 Id. at 1148-49 (discussing that within each sample used, the subjects' age,
sex, race, offense history, IQ classification, and socioeconomic level were considered).




207 Raymond Chao, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple as A-B-C, 21 WHIrTTER L.
REV. 521, 526 (2000).
208 Boyd, supra note 116, at 402 (stating that juveniles are very susceptible to
psychological techniques used by the police).
[Vol. 88:561
PROTECTION OF JUVENILES' RIGHTS
wish to please authority figures and will often tell the
investigator what the child believes the investigator wants to
hear. °9  Further, psychological research on children's
understanding of the Miranda warning suggests that children
are more likely to give false confessions when police use
interrogation techniques designed for adults.21 0 "Inappropriate
questioning, such as suggestive or coercive questions, can lead
juveniles to make statements that may misrepresent the facts
and potentially incriminate innocent defendants."2
E. Miranda Application to Adults with Mental Incapacity
Because the Supreme Court has not yet formulated a test for
determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver of rights by
juveniles questioned without parental notification, it may be
instructive to analyze an approach the courts use when it comes
to adults with a mental defect or subordinate intelligence.
Adults with a mental defect or subordinate intelligence can be
compared to juveniles from a legal standpoint because of their
limited cognitive ability."2 Several courts have held that when a
person's cognitive ability is low, the constitutional protections
from police coercion should be high.1 3 For instance, in Smith v.
Zant, 14 the Eleventh Circuit held that the suspect's mental
defect prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent
Miranda waiver. 15 The treatment of mentally retarded people
can be compared to juveniles because even though juveniles "do
not have cognitive limitations due to mental defect, [they] have
cognitive limitations due to lack of maturity and their young
age."216
209 Id. at 403.
210 Id.
211 Id. ("Young children more easily succumb to suggestion, trickery, and
coercion, resulting in false, self-incriminating statements.").
212 McGuire, supra note 70, at 1367.
213 See, e.g., Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712, 718-19 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 873 F.2d 253, 253 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that the defendant
deserved more protection from police coercion where there was evidence of a definite
mental defect, and concluding that defendant did not intelligently waive his
Miranda rights); United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding
that the Miranda waiver of a man with a low I.Q. level and a mental age of an eight-
year-old was invalid).
214 855 F.2d 712 (1988).
215 See id. at 718-19.
211 McGuire, supra note 70, at 1369.
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found that low mental
capacity coupled with limited English skills can constitute
grounds to invalidate a Miranda waiver.217 The court held that
the suspect's low intelligence and inability to understand English
made him unable to intelligently and voluntarily waive his
rights.21 This case is pertinent to juvenile constitutional rights
because the court analyzed the limited ability of an individual to
understand the Miranda rights being read to him due to
cognitive limitations, just as a juvenile may be unable to
understand the Miranda warning due to limited development
because of young age.219
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The American justice system provides for a fair trial, not a
perfect one. But there is no justice served when a seven or an
eight-year-old child confesses to a crime the child did not commit
because of being questioned without the presence of an interested
adult.2 In light of the startling number of wrongful juvenile
convictions,22' society must not rush to convict children. Society
must take steps to remedy the existing problem, and the most
feasible way to do so is through legislative reform.
In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Delinquency Act,
which provides that "the arresting officer shall immediately
advise [the] juvenile of his legal rights, in language
comprehensive to a juvenile, and shall immediately notify ... the
juvenile's] parents, guardian, or custodian of the rights of the
juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense."222 One of the
problems with the Act is that it does not specify whether the
juvenile's statements are admissible into evidence if the parents
are not notified. Another problem is that the Act does not afford
juveniles sufficient protection because there is no clearly
217 See United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1998).
218 Id.
219 McGuire, supra note 70, at 1369.
220 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
221 Benjamin E. Friedman, Note, Protecting Truth: An Argument for Juvenile
Rights and a Return to In re Gault, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 165, 179 (2011)
(stating "that in juvenile wrongful-conviction cases, 42 percent were attributable to
false confessions, and for children between the ages of twelve and fifteen, the
percentage leaps to 69 percent").
222 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (2012).
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established requirement that the police advise juveniles of their
right to have a parent present during questioning or of their
right to consult with their parents.223
This Note has evaluated the different approaches federal and
state courts apply to determine whether a juvenile's waiver of
rights-made without parental notification or presence-is
voluntary, and has evaluated the shortcomings of the
approaches. This Note proposes an amendment to the Juvenile
Delinquency Act to reflect the continuing concerns of legal society
over false confessions produced by juveniles. It proposes
excluding confessions of juveniles under the age of fifteen if their
parents were not notified and they were questioned without the
presence of both a parent and an attorney. Confessions of
juveniles ages fifteen and older should be evaluated using the
totality of the circumstances approach, where the absence of a
parent and an attorney during questioning is among the factors
to be considered.
Because Grisso's study indicates that juveniles under the age
of fifteen cannot give a meaningful waiver of their Miranda
rights, the best approach is to apply per se exclusion to
confessions of juveniles under the age of fifteen when statutory
requirements are not met.224 To ensure maximum protection for
juveniles and consistency of application, this Note suggests going
one step further than merely notifying the parents of the rights
of the juvenile. It suggests implementing a rule that requires the
parents' presence during the interrogation. The presence of a
juvenile's parent will provide for a more neutral environment
where the juvenile feels comfortable enough to answer freely and
not be pressured into producing a certain response.
To further promote an environment that affords
constitutional due process to juveniles, this Note proposes adding
a requirement to have counsel present during the
interrogation.22  This would ensure that even if the parents do
223 Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010); see Hardaway v.
Young, 302 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe mere absence of a friendly adult is
by itself insufficient to require suppression of a juvenile confession."); see also
Blankenship v. Estep, No. 05-CV-02066-WDM-KLM, 2008 WL 4964712, at *4 (D.
Colo. Nov. 18, 2008) ("[I]t is not a fundamental right to have a parent or guardian
present during Miranda advisements and waivers by juveniles.").
224 Grisso, supra note 179, at 1135.
225 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (stating that the presence
of an attorney "enhances the integrity of the fact-finding processes in court"); see also
20141
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
have a limited understanding of the waiver of the juvenile's
rights, they may be advised by a professional with a full
comprehension of the law.226 Further, the presence of counsel
will act to prevent the pressure parents may put on their
children to confess and will ensure that any decision made is in
the best legal interests of the child.227  Because juveniles often
give false information during police interrogations, the
exclusionary rule could only serve to promote accuracy. This test
will also prevent the inconsistent results produced by the Ninth
Circuit approach-which requires several different balancing
tests and evaluations to determine admissibility of statements-
while ensuring that the procedural safeguards intended by
Congress are afforded to juveniles.
Further, "[a] court would make judgments ... on issues of
police misconduct or constitutional improprieties-rather than
being forced to make judgments more appropriate for a child
psychologist.""22  Therefore, any confession made by a juvenile
under the age of fifteen without the presence of both a parent
and an attorney would be inadmissible. This standard would
make the results not only more just, but also more uniform and
consistent, at least at the federal level.
Because the exclusionary remedy is not one the courts apply
lightly,229 the totality of the circumstances approach should be
applied to determine voluntariness of confessions of juveniles
aged fifteen and older. As Grisso's study suggested, fifteen and
sixteen-year-olds have a better comprehension of the Miranda
warning.23 ° In fact, his study showed that their understanding of
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38 (1967) (stating that the President's Crime Commission
recommended that in order to assure "procedural justice for the child," counsel has
to be appointed when coercive action is a possibility).
226 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 ("Without the protections flowing from
adequate warning and the rights of counsel, 'all the careful safeguards erected
around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness, would
become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible
evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the
unsupervised pleasure of the police.'") (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685
(1961)); see also Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 591 (2009) (stating that having an
attorney ensures that police manipulation does not deprive the defendant of effective
representation at the only stage when legal advice would help him).
227 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 40 (stating that counsel is "helpful in making reasoned
determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition").
228 McGuire, supra note 70, at 1386.
229 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006).
230 Grisso, supra note 179, at 1164-65.
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the Miranda warning was comparable to that of adults.23
Because of the increasing number of crimes committed by
juveniles, there is also an obligation to provide law enforcement
with the proper tools of interrogation to solve crimes. Because a
confession is powerful evidence of guilt, there is a strong public
policy in favor of law enforcement being able to properly utilize
this tool.232 And with juveniles who are old enough to have a
better understanding of what it means to waive their rights, the
courts should apply the totality of the circumstances approach to
determine whether the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently.
Even given all of its flaws, the totality of the circumstances
approach mandates an "inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation."233  If applied properly, as
theCourt intended its application in Fare v. Michael C., this
approach would be sufficient to determine whether the waiver
had been voluntary.234 It also provides for an effective way of
dealing with juveniles who clearly understand the effect of their
waivers and does not unnecessarily burden law enforcement.
Additionally, courts are equipped under this approach to consider
the lack of a parent and an attorney being present as a factor
within the totality of the circumstances test, and as many circuit
courts have held, "an arrestee's juvenile status and the absence
of a parent are certainly important factors that must be
considered in assessing the voluntariness of a juvenile's
statement."235 Additionally, by requiring only one balancing test,
this approach provides more consistency and predictability than
the Ninth Circuit approach, which requires the courts to make
several legal determinations when determining admissibility.2 6
Thus, the balanced application of both the per se
exclusionary approach and the totality of the circumstances
approach would ensure that juveniles are voluntarily waiving
their rights while still serving the state's interest in effective
231 Id.
232 See Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution
for Excluding Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2008).
233 United States v. Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d 312, 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
234 See Fare, 442 U.S. at 727-28.
23' Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 321; Gilbert v. Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 791 (7th
Cir. 2007); Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2002).
236 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 1009, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2000).
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police investigations. Although this approach may not be
immune from criticism, it represents a balanced solution that
accounts for psychological development of the adolescent mind.
The proposed change affords more protection to both the younger
and the older juveniles. The younger juveniles-those under the
age of fifteen-will be afforded more protection by requiring the
presence of a parent and an attorney to make sure the juveniles
have a proper understanding of a waiver of their rights. The
older juveniles' confessions will be evaluated under the totality of
the circumstances approach to make sure that the confessions
are made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
CONCLUSION
The question of how juvenile confessions should be treated
has been addressed by courts for a long time; however, the
approaches currently used fail to provide sufficient statutory and
constitutional due process protections to juveniles. In
determining the admissibility of juvenile confessions made
without parental notification, some courts apply the totality of
the circumstances approach, which leads not only to inconsistent
outcomes, but also to admissibility of statements by juveniles
with an I.Q. level low enough to fall within the range of mental
retardation. The second approach-that of the Ninth Circuit-
involves a number of steps requiring several different inquiries
that often invite inconsistent opinions by judges. The third
approach, used by several state courts, is a per se exclusionary
approach that fails to account for circumstances in which parents
might not have the child's best legal interests in mind.
To remedy this problem, this Note proposes a change to the
Juvenile Delinquency Act to ensure more protection for juveniles
and consistency of application at the federal level. Under this
proposed amendment, the statement of a juvenile under fifteen
years of age would be excluded unless the juvenile was
interrogated in the presence of both a parent and an attorney.
As for juveniles between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, the
Juvenile Delinquency Act should require the application of the
totality of the circumstances approach, which will consider the
absence of a parent and an attorney as a factor in the
determination of whether the juvenile's confession was
voluntary. This new approach will not only provide better
statutory and due process protection to juveniles, but will also
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ensure that law enforcement possesses the tools necessary to
conduct a proper interrogation and convict those who are guilty.
Additionally, an improved federal statute could serve as a model
for uniform adoption at the state level.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLES
DECOUPLING THE LAW OF WILL-EXECUTION
REASONABLE PRECAUTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: RECONCILING
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY WITH THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS
NOTES
LET GHOSTS BE GHOSTS
A PICTURE SAYS A THOUSAND WORDS:
APPLYING FOIA'S EXEMPTION 7(C) TO MUG SHOTS
WHY TITLE VII'S PARTICIPATION CLAUSE NEEDS To BE
BROADLY INTERPRETED To PROTECT THOSE INVOLVED
IN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
SUSPICIOUS SUSPECT CLASSES-ARE NONIMMIGRANTS
ENTITLED TO STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?:
AN ANALYSIS OF DANDAMUDI AND LECLERC
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LENGTHY TERM-OF-YEARS
SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE NON-HOMICIDE OFFENDERS
MARK GLOVER
DOV WAISMAN
MICHAEL L. WELLS
TONI L. MINCIELI
REBECCA ROSEDALE
MAY M. MANSOUR
JOHN HARRAS
REBECCA LOWRY
